Glorfindel
Physical security comprise one of the many elements that makeup a nuclear security program. Protection systems are designed to secure physical assets from unauthorized access and/or removal (pending the strategy). A physical protection system's effectiveness is measured by its ability to detect, delay, and respond to a threat.
Ultimately, the physical protection system is designed so that the time it takes a potential adversary from accomplishing a illicit goal is greater than the time it takes the Anshar protective forces to neutralize that threat.
Since a physical protection system's effectiveness can be measured as a function of time, modeling and simulation are important tools in determining the varied pathways an adversary could follow, where the adversary would be detected, and the time required to respond to that threat.
The AAEA, SNRI, and the security firm Cooperzino has collaborated on a new approach to security called the Glorfindel project. The purpose of this project is to use a predefined Risk Assessment Methodology (RAM) to identify and prioritize risks and determine the best tools to mitigate those risks. If successful, this RAM could be used to evaluate the risk that other facilities across Anshar's nuclear and radiological complex.
The Glordindel project focused on the physical protection (PP) and nuclear material control and accounting (NMAC) systems deployed at SNRI. This initiatory project focused on creating a system where all known information could be gathered about threats and security systems so that they could be effectively modeled in a simulated environment.
The first step in the process was characterizing the PP and NMAC systems in it's current configuration at the site. This meant segregating the facility into categories based on the type of assets they housed.
Once the facility was put into categories based on the assets they housed, the team then assumed the role of an adversary and began to determine if there were any vulnerabilities that a would be adversary could exploit.
The team characterized all of the NMAC and PP systems located through the site and then characterized the Design Basis Threat (DBT) that might attempt to gain unauthorized access to this material.
Once the characterization was complete, AAEA, SNRI, and Cooperzino subject matter experts built a model inside the Denethor computing system to run simulations of potential attacks. The Denethor identified thousands of potential pathways the adversary might exploit to gain access to the nuclear assets. Some attempts were successful and many others were neutralized by SNRI's protective forces.
However, one consistent flaw that was observed was access control of SNRI employees to move from the Limited Area to the Protected Area.
The Glorfindel project identified that SNRI's non-nuclear population does not have any need to access the Protected Area and therefore security measures should be in place to prevent access.
More stringent access controls should be deployed at at the main Access Control Building. In addition, the Glorfindel project identified that employees working in the Fuel Fabrication building rarely enter the reactor building. The further segregate staff and minimize the total population with access to material, additional access control are necessary
Numerous options were explored. Thanks to Cooperzino, several cost efficient and security effectve solutions were examined to increase existing building access controls.
A decision through the Glorfindel process was made to install biometric readers at each building. All personnel entering the building must pass a badge, personal identification number, and a hand geometry credential check before access was granted.
These systems have now been deployed in response to this identified vulnerability. The Glorfindel project will now be adapted to another AAEA regulated site for further validation and verification.
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